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Abstract 
 
To mitigate disruptions to commercial power 
grids, and to achieve operational efficiencies by 
managing energy use, many organizations are fielding 
smaller, local, self-contained microgrids. The 
computer control systems that operate the microgrids 
create new vulnerabilities to a rapidly-escalating 
array of cyber attacks. This creates a tension between 
the need to improve energy assurance and efficiency 
through microgrids, and the need to protect against 
cyber attacks that can disrupt and damage the 
organization’s energy systems. Through a series of 
interviews with subject matter experts and end-users, 
this exploratory study surfaces the decision-makers’ 
important values in this decision space and develops a 
network of those values to guide decision-makers to 
make better decisions in balancing these competing 
needs. 
 
 
1. Background 
 
As disasters, such as Superstorm Sandy in the 
Northeastern United States demonstrate, even 
relatively brief lack of energy can curtail critical 
services including transportation, healthcare, 
communication and security [4]. Protecting critical 
infrastructures, such as energy, has become a national 
security issue, e.g., [13], [15], [34]. Reliance on 
commercial power grids is important for the United 
States (US) Department of Defense (DoD), which is 
the United States’ top consumer of electricity, and 
which relies on the commercial power grid to supply 
essentially all its electrical power, including power to  
91% of its “most critical” infrastructure [8].  The DoD 
is vulnerable to natural and intentional outages and 
“[i]n 2015 alone…experienced approximately 127 
outages that lasted 8 hours or longer, caused 
by…weather and equipment failure” [8].  
One way to address this vulnerability is through 
microgrids – smaller, local, power grids that can 
function in concert with, or isolated from, commercial 
power grids [19]. Because they can operate 
independently of commercial grids they can provide 
electricity when commercial grids are down [2], [19],  
[25]. They provide capability for operational 
management of the local grid that can lower costs [19].  
These benefits come at a cost, however, because 
microgrids rely on computerized control systems to 
govern their activity, and these control systems 
introduce the potential vulnerability to cyber threats 
[2]. Control systems, or Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems, have the capability to 
adjust the energy system [5], [16]. Such SCADA 
systems are often interoperable, which improves the 
potential benefit via information sharing and greater 
efficiencies, but also increases the risks of cyber 
intrusion, as instances such as the Havex attacks 
beginning in 2013 [15] and the Ukraine cyber attacks 
of 2015 [15], [34] demonstrate. As the DoE notes [8], 
from 2001 to 2015, the number of devices connected 
to the internet grew from 400 million to 25 billion. 
Concomitant with this growth in connects has come an 
increase in cyber threats and attacks [13], [14], [15], 
[21]. Attackers include both state and non-state actors 
[15], and experts expect attacks to continue [34]. 
Decisions about control system cyber security 
often require trade-offs between greater resilience and 
greater vulnerability, and the impacts of cyber-security 
interventions are difficult to evaluate [31]. For 
example, is providing off-site access to a control 
system good, as it allows installation personnel to 
quickly repair problems, or is it bad as it creates an 
additional vulnerability to cyber attack? Is the cost of 
one worth the benefit of the other?  
In the context of Navy installations, we explore 
the values of energy managers and control system 
engineers responsible for making these decisions at 
US Navy installations. Using Value-Focused Thinking 
(VFT) [17], we interview these stakeholders to 
identify, synthesize and organize the relevant values. 
This process can lead stakeholders to identify values 
that might not be explicit, and how values contribute 
to the organization’s fundamental values. For 
example, in our study, cyber security is only a means 
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to the end of providing reliable energy to sustain the 
mission at bases. Understanding this can help clarify 
whether interventions that reduce cyber-vulnerability 
are worth any degradation of functionality of the  
energy system. In addition, VFT can reduce the 
perceived tension between competing values and lead 
stakeholders to identify creative alternatives that 
improve all objectives.  In adopting this approach, we 
follow other information scholars, e.g., [10], [27], and 
[30], who have used it to understand information 
systems security; we contribute to this conversation by 
exploring this approach in a context requiring 
important trade-offs which can have significant 
national and international security implications. 
Keeney’s value-focused thinking [17] formulates 
decisions not as problems, but as opportunities. 
Keeney defines values as “principles used…to 
evaluate the actual or potential consequences of action 
and inaction, of proposed alternatives, and of 
decisions.” [17, loc. 157]. Value-focused thinking 
seeks to surface values that decision-makers hold, 
perhaps implicitly. These implicit values, when 
considered explicitly, often present unconsidered 
objectives that can lead to new, also unconsidered 
opportunities for potentially better solutions. 
Objectives, on Keeney’s view, are simply “a statement 
of something someone desires to achieve” [17, loc. 
482]. Objectives take two forms: fundamental 
objectives are “essential reason[s] for interest in a 
decision situation” [17, loc. 482], whereas means 
objectives simply enable achieving fundamental 
objectives [17]. Additionally, value-focused thinking 
encourages decision-makers to clarify their values 
explicitly, both in terms of definitions and in terms of 
a hierarchy of importance, which can lead to more 
measurable decision objectives and outcomes, which 
in turn enables more measurable costs and benefits to 
trade against each other in making better decisions.  
In our study, we formulate the decision 
opportunity as, “which cyber product(s) do we buy to 
protect our control system and microgrid?” In 
formulating the decision opportunity this way, we 
extend Dhillon & Torkzadeh’s research [10] on the 
value of information security, who note that 
information security lacks an inherent value 
proposition, by providing an explicit trade-off, the 
benefits of increased energy assurance. This insight – 
that cyber security is a means to an end – reliable 
energy – emerged from this work as well. 
 
2. Research approach 
 
We recruited our participants by identifying 
organizations in US Navy installations that both work 
with control systems and have a primary mission to 
provide energy services. We interviewed nine 
participants from three organizations [18], [29], 
representing a purposeful sample [6], [28] of facility 
managers and engineers responsible for making and/or 
informing decisions about cyber security of US Navy 
energy SCADA systems; these participants are both 
potential end-users as well as subject matter experts in 
the area. While representative of personnel at other US 
Navy installations, and reasonably representative of 
those at other DoD installations, these personnel in 
some ways represent an extreme case relative to non-
DoD organizations [28] in that the consequences of 
losing energy assurance can lead to serious national 
and international security consequences [7].  
During these interviews, we elicited values and 
objectives, and the participants clarified those values 
and objectives; we then organized the objectives into 
a means-ends network, in which we present the 
objectives graphically in a relational hierarchy [17]. 
The contribution of the analysts was to get participants 
thinking about the issues, eliciting expressions of 
value, clarifying into objectives, and organizing their 
objectives according to how and why they are 
important.  
We developed an initial comprehensive interview 
protocol of eleven possible questions, based on 
previous research (particularly, e.g., [20], but our 
literature review more broadly). In practice, we 
narrowed the protocol to the first three questions, 
based on time constraints for each interview (three 
primary questions typically generated an hour-long 
interview for a participant). These questions were 
designed to surface values relating to SCADA system 
performance generally, SCADA system performance 
under cyber attack, and potential worst-case 
consequences of such an attack. Our original interview 
protocol included these eleven questions: 
 
1. List what is important to you regarding the 
performance of CS networks.   
2. Describe the ideal performance of a 
microgrid under a cyberattack (or 
electrical grid if no microgrid).   
3. List the consequences of a worst-case 
scenario (within reason).   
4. List what is important to you regarding 
cybersecurity performance for CS 
networks.   
5. What are your current concerns relating to 
security threats on CS networks?   
6. What can be done to raise awareness of 
cybersecurity threats on CS networks? 
(Maitland et al., 2013)   
7. What are some of the issues that prevent the 
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effectiveness of CS networks? (Maitland 
et al., 2013)   
8. How would you evaluate cybersecurity 
threats on CS networks?   
9. How would you evaluate your vulnerability 
to cyber threats?   
10. What would you tell other energy engineers 
to do to maintain cybersecurity, CS 
networking performance?   
11. What can the owners of commercial-run 
power plants do to increase safety against 
cybersecurity threats?   
 
 We recorded participant answers on white board 
for ease of reference, and then asked two follow-up 
questions designed to clarify their answers and to 
convert their answers into objectives: “why is that 
important?”, which helps identify fundamental 
objectives, and “what do you mean by that?”, which 
helps identify means objectives [17], [20]. We 
captured the raw interview data for future analysis. 
 
3. Analysis and results 
 
3.1. Applying value-focused thinking 
 
To illustrate our interview approach, a common 
initial answer to our question about consequences – an 
answer consistent with the extreme sample - was either 
“death” or “casualties”. Participants typically clarified 
this answer (“what do you mean by that?”) to an 
objective of “minimizing casualties”, and then 
explained (“why is that important?”) casualties meant 
loss of life, a fundamental failure and thus a 
fundamental objective. (Casualties, our participants 
explained, can affect mission accomplishment, but 
moreover, casualties from our participants’ view, are 
inherently bad.) Similarly, another typically important 
aspect of SCADA system performance was 
“maximize resiliency”, which our participants 
clarified meant “minimizing down time”. This 
clarification process helped distinguish resilience from 
other characteristics, such as durability and flexibility; 
for our participants, resilience referred to responding 
to a problem (how long until it is resolved?), whereas 
flexibility referred to preventing outages and 
managing reductions in capability to sustain the most 
important functions.  
From our interviews, we developed a means-ends 
network, graphically displaying the fundamental, or  
ends objectives in the smaller grouping at the top; the 
means objectives in the larger grouping; and their 
hierarchical interrelationships, represented by arrows 
showing how lower-level means objectives lead to 
higher-level objectives (see Figure 1). We discuss 
each objective below.
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Figure 1: Means-ends objective network
 
3.2. Fundamental objectives 
 
Our participants surfaced four fundamental 
objectives, which were common to all nine 
participants: maximizing reliability, maximizing 
reputation, minimizing cost, and minimizing 
casualties; two of these ends objectives contribute to a 
third ends objective, with maximizing reliability and 
minimizing costs contributing to maximizing the 
organization’s reputation. The participants also 
surfaced a strategic fundamental objective, 
maximizing installation support, roughly defined as 
“providing the best possible energy support necessary 
to accomplish the mission”. This defines the reason for 
operating the installations, thus it is a strategic 
objective, one of a “decision maker’s broadest 
objectives” [17, loc 2348]. We discuss each 
fundamental objective in turn. 
 
3.2.1. Maximize reliability 
 
Each participant initially defined this objective 
somewhat differently, based in part on their 
organization, its mission, and their role in that 
organization. A synthesis of their definitions, 
however, is very similar to “the ability of an energy 
production system to provide consistent and expected 
levels of energy under stated conditions for a specified 
period of time” [12]. Participants identified several 
recurring means objectives as contributing to 
maximizing reliability, including minimizing outages, 
maximizing regulatory compliance, maximizing 
resilience and maximizing flexibility. 
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3.2.2. Maximize reputation 
 
The participants all expressed a belief that their 
organization’s reputation was both valuable and 
important. This was initially surprising as reputation 
does not immediately seem fundamental to Navy 
installations. However, several participants expressed 
that without the trust of their customers – those 
depending on installation services – the customers 
would stop relying on them which would degrade their 
ability to do the mission and incur additional costs. 
This fundamental objective appears to manifest two 
other fundamental objectives, maximizing reliability 
and minimizing cost. This is consistent with a general 
belief that government functions better when the 
public trusts it [24].  
 
3.2.3. Minimize cost 
 
All nine participants mentioned minimizing costs 
– labor, materials, time, and money – as important. 
SCADA systems contribute to greater efficiency, thus 
decreasing costs, and microgrids provide redundancy 
against commercial grid outages. One participant 
noted that by keeping energy costs low, that provider 
was able to bill its customers on the installation at a 
lower cost, thus preserving its customers’ resources to 
spend on their organizational missions.  
 
3.2.4. Minimize casualties 
 
Perhaps because of the larger Navy and DoD 
missions, all participants were concerned with 
preventing death and casualties. This belief appears 
based in part on both regulatory guidance and 
experience. Safety is a “vital enabler” to the mission 
[23], and [3] reports over 150 deaths per year are 
related to electrical systems.  
 
3.3. Means objectives 
 
The nine participants identified twenty-four 
means objectives, organized in a network in figure 1. 
While all participants agreed on the four fundamental 
objectives, not every participant mentioned every 
means objective. Here, we discuss six of the most 
important means objectives, including the most-
frequently mentioned means objectives, maximizing 
resilience, minimizing labor, maximizing regulatory 
compliance, maximizing flexibility, minimizing cyber 
vulnerability and minimizing control system 
complexity. As means objectives move further away 
from fundamental objectives they can become more 
like options or alternatives – the kill switch objective 
in the bottom left of Figure 1 is an example. We 
generally kept the network to objectives, stopping 
before specifying decision-specific alternatives or 
options (parts of alternatives). 
 
3.3.1. Maximize resilience 
 
All nine participants viewed resilience as an 
important means objective, contributing directly to 
two ends objectives, maximizing reliability and 
minimizing costs. As discussed elsewhere, resilience 
for our participants meant recovering from disruptions 
[9]. Control systems maximize resilience, e.g., by 
minimizing response times in disruptions, and 
identifying the location and likely cause of 
disruptions, this minimizing problem-solving, trouble-
shooting, and repair times. Participants observed that 
redundancy improves resilience. Finally, one 
participant noted that having the ability to disconnect 
the control system and use manual controls was an 
important aspect of resilience. 
 
3.3.2. Minimize labor 
 
SCADA systems increase efficiency, thus 
reducing the amount of labor required to do a job [33], 
and ultimately contributing to the ends objective of 
minimizing costs. For example, these systems can 
minimize necessary maintenance and optimize 
maintenance times. Such labor savings were important 
to all nine participants. 
 
3.3.3. Maximize regulatory compliance 
 
Regulatory compliance enables both cost 
minimization and greater reliability. One participant 
noted that compliance avoids costs, an ends objective; 
to illustrate this, the Navy installation at Joint Base 
Pearl Harbor paid a fine approaching $100,000 based 
on an environmental violation [22]. This fine reduced 
resource available for other needs, including ensuring 
reliable energy, another ends objective. 
 
3.3.4. Maximize flexibility 
 
Our participants believed greater flexibility 
increased reliability, an important ends objective. A 
flexible control system can maintain its distribution 
despite supply and demand fluctuations [26], thus 
contributing to reliability. The greater availability of 
renewable energy sources, such as hydroelectricity and 
solar, increase, energy systems has increased the need 
for flexibility as well [26]. 
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3.3.5. Minimize cyber vulnerability 
 
All nine participants surfaced concerns about 
cyber vulnerabilities, but not all nine agreed on the 
magnitude of those vulnerabilities. Some were more 
concerned with nation state attacks, such as that on the 
Ukraine, while others discussed non-state hackers as a 
threat. All agreed that minimizing physical and 
network access is an important safeguard. This means 
objective contributes directly and indirectly to several 
other means objectives, and ultimately to both 
maximizing reliability and minimizing costs as ends 
objectives.  
 
3.3.6. Minimize control system complexity 
 
Our participants noted that minimizing control 
system complexity is an important means objective 
that contributes to minimizing errors and updates, both 
of which operate through several other ends objectives 
to reduce reliability and increase costs.  
 
3.4. Identifying tradeoffs 
 
Our participants routinely identified two 
important trade-offs they must consider in making 
decisions in this context. First, they consider trade-offs 
between functionality and security. Perhaps based on 
their functional backgrounds, our respondents viewed 
functionality and security as potentially-competing 
objectives; improving security, in their view, could 
require decreasing functionality. For example, while 
providing off-site access to the system might enable 
managers to respond quickly to failures, it would also 
create an access point for a cyber attacker. As one 
participant noted, “The most secure system is one that 
doesn’t work.” All nine participants agreed on what 
functionality and security mean, and that both 
functionality and security are important; they were 
divided on how to balance the trade-off between the 
two considerations.  
Participants’ preferences on the best way to 
balance the trade-off seems to be related to the 
participant’s role in the organization. A correlation 
that appeared in our small sample is that those with 
greater responsibility, e.g., over many installations, 
seemed to weigh (cyber)security as a greater (but not 
overriding) need. Conversely, an engineer responsible 
for one installations’ system, with a primary concern 
of ensuring customers had the power necessary to 
perform their missions, reported a greater (but again 
not overriding) concern for functionality. Rather than 
worrying over cybersecurity, this participant reported 
that their installation lost power to an entire circuit 
when a gecko electrocuted itself on a wire; this 
participant was more concerned about making 
investments that would ensure uninterrupted access 
against these non-cyber disruptions. Regardless of 
their respective roles in the organization, all 
participants agreed that the two considerations must be 
weighed in every situation. 
The second trade-off our participants commonly 
noted was between user control and automated 
control. While not a universal consideration for all 
nine participants, the importance of being able to 
assume manual control was very important to some 
participants. 
 
4. Discussion, conclusions, limitations, 
and recommendations 
 
Our participants’ means-ends objective network 
tells a story. Their overarching mission is to maximize 
installation support, and that involves maximizing four 
fundamental, or ends, objectives: developing the 
reputation of providing reliable energy at minimal 
cost, while minimizing casualties. A hierarchy of 
means objectives contribute to achieving these ends 
objectives, and thus their mission.  
All our participants were clearly oriented towards 
the strategic objective of mission support, but they 
were split on how best to achieve it. While the network 
in Figure 1 accurately reflects the relationships among 
the ends and means objectives, it does not necessarily 
reflect each participant’s individual ends objectives, 
nor does it reflect the relative importance – which 
differed among participants – they apply to those 
objectives.  
That said, achieving this balance is important, and 
we suggest subject matter experts closer to the end 
user – where the mission is actually supported – are 
best able to make these tradeoffs, with those higher in 
the organization providing oversight of the decisions.  
Our participants valued customer support; they 
believed maximizing reliability is an important ends 
objective. Cybersecurity was important to varying 
degrees to all participants, but for all it was clearly a 
means objective – important because it influences the 
other objectives, and the ability to meet the mission, 
i.e. maximize installation support. All participants 
were very cognizant of the installation’s mission, 
especially the most critical functions. One of the 
benefits of VFT and understanding which objectives 
are means (vs. ends) and which ends they contribute to 
is that it can help stakeholders reduce focus on tension 
and trade-offs and instead identify new alternatives or 
“potential choices to pursuing your [means] 
objectives,” which can increase the ability to achieve 
the fundamental objectives [32].  
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Our study focuses on three naval installations. 
We’ve suggested our sample is reasonably 
representative of other military installations, but the 
small sample size is nonetheless a limitation of our 
study. Future research should explore whether and 
how our findings apply to other installations across all 
services, and to organizations beyond the military. Our 
results also suggest that decision-makers’ values can 
depend on their position and role in the organization, 
but our sample clearly limits our ability to draw strong, 
well-supported conclusions. Future studies could 
address how the position and role in organizational 
hierarchies influences the development of ends-means 
objectives. 
Ongoing and future research can consider how 
best to implement the means-ends network and the 
tradeoffs. For example, ongoing research within the 
Navy is formulating a return on investment model for 
cybersecurity investment based on user values. 
Different decision-making approaches can also inform 
the analysis. For example, multiple-objective decision 
analysis [11] can assess qualitative outputs, such as 
value focused thinking delivers, quantitatively. 
Finally, future research might explore developing 
standard measures the means and ends objectives we 
identify.  
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